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price stability, robust and sustainable economic growth,
|- full emolovment and balanced foreign economic rela-
tions are the broadest strategic goats of any monetary
policy. Although implicitly interrelated with the others,i the
first goal is particularly important for the Bulgarian
economy at the current stage of transition. This strategic
goal is inevitably incorporated in the general trends of de-
velopment of the BNB monetary policy,2 and the regulated
growth of the money supply is identified as a precondition
for attaining it. The BNB strives to attain price stability by
managing reserves, and consequently managing money
supply, using primarily open market operations.
The BNB's attempt to exert influence on the money
market, and thus indirectly influencing inflation, is expli-
cable. This is the usual approach applied in developed mar-
ket economies, where open market operations are the basic
monetary policy instrument. Hence, with the gradual devel-
opment of a government securities market, it is only natural
for the BNB to increasingly rely on this instrument, simul-
taneously abandoning some atypical instruments, intro-
duced as necessitated by transition.r
The above described approach is clearly seen in the cen-
tral bank's intentions: "In 1995 and 1996, money supply
will be used as a nominal anchor in financial stabilization.
Money supply growth will be controlled through reserve
money management, based on a projected change in the
money multiplier. At the same time, the BNB will use the
relationship between the exchange rate and reserve money,
preserving the floating exchange rate of the lev to the US
dollar, Deutchemark and Swiss franc."a Furthermore:
t Price stability, in particular, is identified as an underlying
strategic goal in the Law on the BNB. In accordance withArticle 2,
para. I of the law, the main task of the Bulgarian National Bank
shall be to contribute to the maintenance of the domestic and ex-
ternal stability of the national currency. Fbr this purpose, it shall
formulate and implement the national monetary and credit policy
and shall contribute to the creation and maintenance of fficient
mechanisms of payment.
2 See section "Major Trends in Monetary Policy" in the BNB
annualreportsfor 1991 - 1995.
3 See Filipov, L. Monetary Policy Instruments of the Bulgarian
National Bank. Bank Review, issue I/1994.
a 1994 Annual Report of the BNB, Major Trends in Monetary
Policy in 1995 and 1996, p. 104.
"Open market operations will be the cornerstone of BNB
monetary policy. To this end, the BNB portfolio shall con-
tain a suffrcient amount and variety of government securi-
t ies to regulate commercial bank l iquidity."i
This approach to regulation of money supply in an ac-
tive money market, and such are the BNB intentions,6 re-
quires the existence of certain conditions. The BNB should
understand and be able to accurately project both money de-
mand and supply. Finally, it should have at its disposal reli-
able instruments for controlling money supply. These pre-
conditions are necessitated by the fact that where the
amount of money in circulation and its price are determined
by the market, both sides of the money market are deter-
mined by the aggregate activities of various economic
agents, each of them led by its own goals and purposes.
Households, enterprises and institutions seek money they
need for their transactions, cover contingencies, and main-
tain a porlion of their assets in a highly liquid form. The
BNB in pursuance of its monetary policy in conjunction
with the commercial banks and households determine the
money supply which services the economy. Thus, being
aware of and able to project the dynamics of both sides of
the market, and having the potential to influence it in the
long run, will determine monetary policy efficiency.
This paper considers the extent to which the conditions
stated above are present. The author concludes that the pe-
culiarities of transition are cause for much unceftainty in the
money market, and hence, result in low monetary policy ef-
ficiency. Therefore there is a need for improvement in the
identification and projection of money market conditions,
and the establishment, to the extent possible, of a stable
regulatory frarrrework. To successfully pursue its monetary
policy, the BNB will have to develop a regulatory frame-
work and operating procedures providing for a high degree
of control over changes in the reserve money. Another ma-
jor conclusion is that reached monetary policy efficiency is
highly dependent upon the credibility and stability of the
banking system. Although problems of banking supervi-
sion, banking system stability, and guarantees on different
5 As the above, p. 105.
o See Balyozov, Z. BNB Monetary Policy in 1996, Monthly
Bulletin, issue 2/1996, p. 29.
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types of deposits are traditionally considered separately
from the issues of money supply regulation, they are related
to monetary policy efficiency. This paper proves the need
for monetary policy comprehensiveness in terms of interre-
lation between money supply regulation and foreign ex-
change policy.
Money Market Uncertainty
Money in circulation depends on supply and demand.
These two elements meet at the market and their interaction
determines the interest rate and the money supply required
by economic agents. For bringing it to and maintaining it at
levels corresponding to its monetary policy targets, the
BNB should so control the amount of reserve money, so as
to have supply offset demand at a padicular level of money
supply, corresponding to the Bank's goals. Thus, the BNB
target for the money supply will dictate the market until the
occlrrence of some significant changes in the economic en-
vironment disrupts the equilibrium of the market.
Practical problems in relation to the realization of this
scheme result from the fact that it is impossible to project
money demand with absolute accuracy and that the central
bank may only partially influence money supply. The Bank
has instruments at its disposal for influencing money supply
to a certain extent, but has no full control over it, as this
control is the result of the behavior of other economic
agents, namely commercial banks and saving individuals.
Thus, the actual amount of money in circulation, formed as
a result ofan equilibrium achieved between supply and de-
mand at a certain level, cannot be determined in advance
and may significantly differ from the BNB target.
The central bank, in practice, should determine the ex-
pected values of the real gross domestic product, the price
level, and the elasticity of demand of real equilibrium with
the real gross product and the nominal interest rate. In this
way, the Bank will also determine the expected money de-
mand. The actual real gross product and price level values
will inevitably differ from the Bank's expectations. The dif-
ference between the BNB's expectations for money demand
and the actual level will vary within limits determined by
the accuracy ofprojections ofthe real gross domestic prod-
uct and the price level, and by incidental shocks in money
demand.
The situation with money supply is the same. Having
determined a particular level of reserve money, the BNB
projects a corresponding money supply level. But the actual
money supply will not depend only on the value of reserve
money, but on the banks' behavior as regards their asset and
liability operations, and also on the saving preferences of
individuals. The difference we find in practice between the
projected and the real supply will depend on how accurate
the Bank was in forecasting the behavior of other economlc
agents, and on possible incidental shocks.
Chart 1 shows a diagram of the uncertainty of the money
market, resulting from the uncertainty of both money de-
mand and money supplyT. Let us assume that the immediate
monetary policy target is to maintain the money supply on
level Mo and that the BNB projects the real gross domestic
product and the price level. Then, money demand is ex-
pected to be shown by the Mod, and the Bank should aim at
a reserve money level which would generate money supply
for which market equilibrium is reached at Mo- the money
supply corresponding to BNB's immediate target. Or figu-
ratively speaking, the Bank should aim to generate a depen-
dence between interest rate and money supply which is ex-
pressed by the Mo" curve. Due to a number of factors be-
yond BNB's full control, actual demand and supply will in
most cases differ from its expectations. Let us assume by
analogy that due to an unexpected change in inflation or in
the real gross domestic product, actual demand varies
within Mrd and Mrd. Let us similarly assume that resulting
from the activities of commercial banks and saving indi-
viduals, money supply varies within fuI d ard M rd . Here we
arrive at one of the basic problems of monetary policy. The
central bank is striving for money equal to Mo,buI in prac-
tice it has no full control over money supply, and is not able
to project money demand accurately. As a result, money
supply is determined by the activities of economic agents
and the economic environment, and may vary within M,
and Mr. That is, in the long run it may considerably differ
from the Bank's target Mo. In addition, the diagram clearly
shows that the interest rate, at which equilibrium is achieved
in the money market, may differ considerably from BNB
expectations.
Chart I
Uncertainty of Money Supply and
Market Interest Rate
7 The horizontal axis shows the amount of nominal balances,
and the vertical axis shows the nominal interest rate.
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Formal Analysis of Monetary Policy
The analysis of money market uncertainty can be for-
malized. Such an approach would provide a strictly analyti-
cal basis for decision-making on various monetary policy
aspects. It should be the basis of the quantitative analysis of
money market characteristics.
Let us express money demand and supply functions in a
logarithmic and linear form. This is not the only possible
expression, but it is relatively often used in empirical econo-
metric studiess. Under this assumption, the money market is
characteized by the following system of equations:v
ml : p, + so + arYt - a2rt + et
m l = b o + b r m b r + b r r , + ( ,
where.
m!, mr'are logarithms of money demand and supply re-
spectively;
p,- logarithm of price level;
y, - logarithm of real gross domestic product;
r, - interest rate;
mb,- logarithm of reserve money;
a, - elasticiry of money demand to real gross domestic
product;
D, - elasticity of money supply to reserve money;
a2, b2- sensitivity of demand and supply respectively to
interest rate;
erand (r- random values expressing the uncertainty in
actions of the economic agents in relation to money demand
and money supply respectively.
Let us assume that the monetary policy target for a given
period I is related to maintaining money supply atlevel m, '
Thus, demand and supply is expressed by the following sys-
tem of equations:
,,: pi + ao + ary", - arr,
f r ,=bo+brmb,+br r , ( l  ) ,
wnere,
p," ana ! f are the values expected by 
the Bank for the
price level and real gross domestic product respectively.
Having solved the system for the amount of reserve money,
we arrlve at:
ffib,=
(a, + b,)m, - t,(ri + aryi)- (aob, + a,bo)
(2).
8 See e.g. Poole, W Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instru-
ments in a Symbol Stochastic Macromodel, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 84/1970.
e For more simple designation, all system parameters will be
positive figures. In the money demand equation, therefore, there is
minus before the ratio of money demand sensitivity to the interest
rate.
srbr
This is precisely the amount of reserve money the BNB
targets in order to be in a position to regulate money supply
at the desired level. At the same time, equilibrium at the
money market will be set at a money supply level corre-
sponding to the following interrelation:10
arbrmb, + br(p, + oJ,)+ aobr+ arbo + bre, + sz€, ^.
i l t t :  
\ J ) .
The influence exerted by the BNB on the money market
is accounted for by replacing the value of reserve money (2)
in the obtained dependence of the equilibrium money sup-
ply (3). After substitution and transformation, we arrive at
the following expression of the money supply at the point of
equilibrium:
m t =  m t +
b,(p, - pi)+ b,a,(y, - fi)+ b,e, + a,{,
Here the difference
u 2 +  b 2
between the actual equilibrium
money supply m, and at desired by the Bank, m, , is explic-
itly seen. This difference is the result ofthree conceptually
different groups of factorsll. First, this is the deviation of
the prlce level from the expected value, and the deviation of
the actual from the expected real gross domestic product. It
is clear in this case that with inaccurate price level and pro-
duction projections, the Bank would have erroneous expec-
tations, and hence, will not be in a position to adequately
project transaction money demand.
The second group consists of factors having exogenous
impact on money demand. Changes in the economic envi-
ronrnent, such as dramatic changes in the exchange rate or
in the credibility of the banking system, may influence both
transactional and speculative money demand. Thus money
demand is generated which considerably deviates from the
Bank's expectations.
The third group of factors has exogenous impact on
money supply. Unexpected shifts in the economic environ-
ment may influence the behavior of commercial banks and
saving individuals, thus changing the money multiplier. In
other words, a change in the deposit multiplication process
inthe banking system is effected.
As a result, the reserve money level maintained by the
BNB may differ from the expected money supply.
t0 This result is obtained by solving system (l) in terms o/ the
money supply and the interest rate as endogenous values, while
other values are treated as exogenous.
tt We intentionally do not discuss here the issue of accuracy of
the econometric evaluation of this model s parameters. It is clear
that the comparatively short time series as a result oJ observations
on the variables and the signi/icant structural changes within
short periods oJ time cause certain problems. This additionally in'
creases the uncertainty in analyzing and projecting the equilib-




The uncertainty of the monetary policy impact on
money market equilibrium will inevitably exist in any mar-
ket economy. It is inherent in the market mechanism and the
opporhrnity provided to all economic entities to make au-
tonomous decisions. Thus, the problem faced in economic
transition is not the existence ofuncertainty, but rather the
degree of uncedainty. Where the economy is functioning
through well developed institutions, on stable financial mar-
kets, and with predictable behavior of economic agents, the
degree of uncertainty is comparatively small. Where these
conditions are nonexistent, as in a period oftransition, un-
certainty may be quite high, thus jeopardrzing the efficiency
of the monetary policy. This will have a negative effect on
inflation. This problem is illustrated by Chart 2, which
shows two provisional situations related to different degrees
of uncertainty. In the first, due to insubstantial deviations
from the expected behavior of economic agents regarding
money supply and demand, uncertainty is low. Conse-
quently, money supply and demand curves approximate the
expected demand cwve Mod and the expected supply curve
Mo'.In the first case, the equilibrium money supply may
vary within the intervalMr- Mr.InIhe second case, the de-
viation from the expected behavior of economic agents is
quite large. This provides the conditions for considerable
variation in money supply and demand, causing a high de-
gree of uncertainty on the money market. This is expressed
in the diagram by the actual demand and supply curves,
which are "far" from the expected. In such a situation, the
equilibrium money supply may vary to a greater extent
within the "broad" interval M, - Mo.
The above situation illustrates some of the basic prob-
lems of monetary policy in transition: the high degree of
money market uncertainty, the diffrculties faced in control-
ling money supply and consequently the low monetary
policy effrciency. In this context, we should discuss the pos-
sibilities for diminishing this uncertainty, thus enhancing




Comprehensive examination of the limits of possible en-
hancement of monetary policy efficiency requires a careful
analysis ofthe three sources ofuncertainty. The firsttwo are
related to money demand - it is a question of the deviation
ofactual from expected values for real gross domestic prod-
uct and price level, on the one hand, and of exogenous
shocks affecting money demand, on the other. It is clear
from the evidence cited that pursuing an efficient monetary
policy is impossible without having reliable insight into the
size of money demand. Consequently, an important part of
Chart 2
Degree of Money Market Uncertainty
designing the central bank's monetary policy should be re-
lated to anilyzing and projecting money demand. In this
light, it wbuld be appropriate for the BNB to develop a sub-
stantial mechanism for analyses, which will allow it to pre-
pare short and long-term projections on the dynamics of the
real gross domestic product and the price level. This will
enable it to formulate its own authoritative expectations and
projections on the transaction money demand.
We should note here that there are two particularly im-
portant aspects ofprojection activities. First,itis the central
bank, which should make the projection, without taking
into account external desires for reaching a particular level
of real growth, and without committing itself to any particu-
lar preset inflation target. This projection should undoubt-
edly correspond to the fiscal policy goals, simultaneously
considering all other elements of aggregate demand, so that
BNB expectations are most realistic . Second, the projection
should not be restricted only to the real gross domestic
product and the price level. It should consist ofa variety of
combinations between values for real gross domestic prod-
uct and prices possible at different interest rate levels. Thus,
an overall projection curve of money demand will be out-
lined, rather than a single point on it.
In addition to the transaction demand expectations, the
BNB should estimate anypossible deviations from it, which
may be accounted for by exogenous shocks due to specula-
tive demand. Possible changes in the economic environment
may change the behavior of economic agents in terms of
their choice of assets to be held. Thus, they may put addi-
tional pressure on money demand in one direction or an-
other. This is the possible effect ofsharp exchange rate fluc-
tuations, or of changes in the expectations of economic
agents concerning inflation and lev depreciation.
The above shows the importance of projecting money
demand for the formulation and implementation of mon-
3 7
etary policy. Provided the BNB succeeds in adequately
identiffing possible situations on the money market, it will
be able to regulate it into the desired direction, i.e. to pursue
an anticipatory monetary policy. At the same time, for some
reason, the BNB is not in a position to make relatively reli-
able projections of money demand, both transactional and
speculative, and of the limits within which it may vary, rt
will pursue only a post factum monetary policy. In other
words, it will respond to existing circumstances and will
adapt more quickly to the current environment. The effi-
ciency of such a monetary policy is considerably less than
in the case ofan anticipatory approach.
The next source of monetary policy uncertainty is in re-
lation to supply. A current peculiarity of the Bulgarian
banking system is the uncertainty in terms of both reserve
money and the deposit multiplication process in the system.
Both factors are of considerable irnportance, but for the
monetary policy the issue of reserve money is more critical.
International practice shows that reserve money is usu-
ally, to a great extent or totally, under central bank control.
The situation in Bulgaria is, however, different. Though
theoretically the BNB is in a position to influence the
amount of reserve money, in practice it does not have, at
this stage at least, a high degree of control over it. There are
three reasons for this lack of control. The first results from
the possibility for cornmercial banks to maintain a podion
of their required reserves in foreign exchange. Conse-
quently, a change in the exchange rate causes respective
changes in the reserve money even without intervention by
the BNB. This mechanism favors commercial banks. Other-
wise, they would have to continuously adjust their reserve
requirement level to correspond to the exchange rate fluc-
tuations because a considerable part of their attracted funds
are forex denominated. The price paid for this relief to com-
mercial banks is the partial loss of BNB control over re-
serve money.
The second cause of low control of reserye money is the
comparatively easy, at least until recently, access to over-
draft given to commercial banks. In this context, recent
measures taken by the central bank to harmonize reserve
and settlement accounts, as well as the more stringent re-
strictions imposed upon using the overdraft facility, will re-
sult in improved BNB control over reserve money. The final
reason is related to the independence of the Bulgarian Na-
tional Bank. Notwithstanding the text of Article 47 of the
Law on the BNB,12 which provides for independence of the
Bank from the government in its decision-making, through-
out the whole period of reforms in the banking system to
date, in practice, the Bank's independence has never been
t2 Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, State Gazette, issue
50 of 1991, amend. issue 32 of 1996.
absolute and was in certain cases infringed upon, mainly in
terms of frnancing the state budget. This had a direct impact
on the increase of reserve money and inflation respectively.
For these reasons, it would be expedient for the BNB to pro-
ceed in its efforts for developing a regulatory framework
and practical procedures providing it with monetary policy
instruments that would ensure high control over reserve
money.
Not insignificant for the uncertainty on the monetary
policy influence on money supply is the role of the deposit
multiplication process. In the case of the Bulgarian banking
system, we should note the specific role played by two fac-
tors: confidence in the banking system and the exchange
rate. The loss of confidence of economic entities in the
banking system, or in individual banks, changes the param-
eters of deposit multiplication thus affecting money supply.
The case with the exchange rate is similar. Its sharp fluctua-
tions change the behavior of saving individuals, and ceteris
paribus, the money multiplier. Consequently, the exchange
rate has an effect on money supply through both reserve
money and the money multiplier. In the current phase of
transition, the factors of both the banking system credibility
and strong exchange rate fluctuations are of particular im-
portance for the monetary policy efficiency. They mark sig-
nificant differences from developed market economies.
This leads to more important conclusions. First,the rnef-
ficiency of monetary policy is partly due to reasons which
are in practice external to it. Traditional confidence in the
banking system, and bankipg supervision related to it are
not elements of the monetary policy.lr It becomes more and
more evident, however, that in economic transition these are
of an immediate and decisive importance for its efficiency.
This is to say that monetary policy should be viewed in a
broader context and that its successful implementation is
impossible without coordinated and concomitant measures
for strengthening the credibility of the banking system. Sec-
ond, goals of the monetary and the exchange rate policies
should be harmonized. The significant effect of exchange
rate on money supply affects the equilibrium money stock,
which influences, in part, inflation and the exchange rate.
Consequently, the targets of the monetary policy for con-
trolling money in circulation, and of the exchange rate
policy for maintaining a particular rate of exchange turn out
to be interrelated. Because of its great importance, this in-
terrelation between targets should be identified in detail and
quantitatively atalyzed. Otherwise, the lack of synchroniza-
tion between targets may result in serious deviations in ac-
tual figures from BNB targets for both money supply and
exchanse rate.
t3 In some countries thejt are even regulated by two indepen-
dent institutions.
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